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Abstract 
The notion of a negative relationship between risk and incentives is a central prediction of agency 
theory.  A vast literature has failed to find consistent empirical support for this prediction, with 
some studies finding a positive relationship, some a negative relationship, and some no 
relationship at all.  Prendergast’s (2002) theory extends the principal-agent model to incorporate 
the delegation of worker authority, showing that a positive relationship between risk and 
incentives can arise and potentially explaining the mixed results from empirical tests.  In this 
paper, we empirically test Prendergast’s theory.  Using a large, nationally-representative cross 
section of British establishments that includes information both from employers and from 
multiple workers in each establishment, we address four empirical questions: 1) Is there evidence 
of a risk-incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal-agent model? 2) Is there evidence of a 
positive relationship between incentive pay and the delegation of worker authority as assumed by 
Prendergast? 3) Is there evidence of a positive relationship between risk and authority as 
Prendergast also assumes? 4) Is there empirical support for the main testable implication of 
Prendergast’s model, namely that the evidence favoring a risk-incentives tradeoff should 
strengthen when authority controls are added to the model?  Our answers are affirmative for all 
four questions.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The notion of a tradeoff between risk and incentives is a key implication of the 
principal-agent model that has received significant attention in the literature since the 
original papers by Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979).  The intuition is that risk-
averse workers are loathe to accept output-contingent compensation contracts in 
production settings characterized by a high degree of risk, meaning situations in which 
output is determined largely by stochastic factors beyond the worker’s control.  The 
firm’s response, therefore, is to decrease the amount of output-based pay as the degree of 
risk or uncertainty in the production environment increases.  This theoretical prediction 
has been the subject of numerous empirical tests, and the collective evidence has been 
inconclusive.  As seen in the last column of Table 1, some tests have found the predicted 
negative relationship, while others have found a positive relationship or no relationship. 
Prendergast (2002) proposes a theory that potentially explains the inconclusive 
empirical evidence.  At the heart of Prendergast’s explanation is the delegation of worker 
authority which, he argues, is a key element that the standard agency model ignores.  In 
production settings characterized by a low level of uncertainty, the firm has a clear sense 
of what tasks should be performed and how they should be performed.  In such settings, 
the firm is content to monitor labor inputs.  In contrast, when the production setting is 
characterized by a high level of uncertainty, the firm understands less what decisions 
need to be made and which tasks should be performed.  The firm responds by delegating 
more authority to the worker, who is closer to the production process and often has better 
information than does the firm about what tasks should be performed.  The firm 
accompanies this delegation of authority with output-based pay, to hold the worker 
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accountable for his decisions and to ensure that the worker does not misuse his discretion 
by choosing the wrong tasks.  That is, when the degree of uncertainty increases, the firm 
shifts from monitoring inputs and retaining control over tasks to monitoring outputs and 
delegating authority over tasks.   
This suggests a positive relationship between incentive pay and risk (operating 
through the channel of worker authority), in contrast to the negative relationship 
(operating through the channel of insurance) implied by standard agency theory.  Thus, 
the main testable result of Prendergast’s model is that the predicted sign of the 
relationship between risk and incentives is ambiguous.  He states the empirical problem 
as follows:   
“The empirical difficulty here is that worker discretion is typically unobserved that could 
bias econometric estimates … without controlling for some measure of responsibility, we 
are likely to find a positive relationship between uncertainty and incentives; but if we can 
control for task assignment, we would expect to see no such relationship.”  (pp. 1096-
1097) 
 
Thus, Prendergast argues that controlling for worker authority in a regression of incentive 
pay on risk should decrease the coefficient of risk.  A potential problem with conducting 
the empirical test in this way is that the degree of worker authority is endogenous, since it 
is chosen by the employer along with the structure of the compensation plan.  Since the 
unobserved determinants of both choices are likely to be correlated, if a regression of 
incentive pay on risk includes authority controls the estimated coefficients will be biased.  
The correct empirical model must treat the degree of worker authority as endogenous.   
 Prendergast cites several empirical papers that provide indirect support for his 
theory, but a direct test requires that worker authority be incorporated into the standard 
risk-incentives regressions.  A practical difficulty with implementing this test is that 
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measures of worker authority over task selection are rarely available in existing data sets.  
Furthermore, measures of worker authority must be available in conjunction with 
measures of incentive pay and risk for the theory to be tested.  Our empirical tests are 
based on a large, nationally-representative cross section of British establishments from 
the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), containing information on 
risk, multiple dimensions of worker authority (both as perceived by workers and as 
perceived by employers), and incentive pay.   
 We address four empirical questions in this paper.  Is there empirical support for:  
1) the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by agency theory? 
2) Prendergast’s assumption that authority and incentives are positively related? 
3) Prendergast’s assumption that risk and authority are positively related? 
4) the main testable implication of Prendergast’s model, namely that empirical 
support for the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by agency theory should 
strengthen when authority is incorporated into a risk-incentives regression model? 
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE  
In Prendergast’s model, the agent is assumed to be risk neutral (to remove the 
standard risk-incentives tradeoff and focus purely on delegation) and exerts effort on one 
of n possible tasks.  The principal chooses the compensation contract (either input-based 
or output-based) and either assigns the agent a task or grants the agent discretion over 
which task to choose.  In contrast to the traditional approach in agency theory that treats 
uncertainty in the economic environment as synonymous with measurement error arising 
from the principal’s inability to observe the agent’s effort perfectly (e.g. Holmstrom and 
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Milgrom (1987, 1991)), Prendergast distinguishes between these two concepts and 
defines risk only as environmental uncertainty.  Performance of the firm is given by yi = 
ei + εi where i denotes the agent’s task.  The n random variables εi have common 
variance, σ2, but differ in their means.  An increase in σ2 implies a more uncertain 
production environment.   
An important underlying assumption is asymmetric information about the 
outcome of the environmental uncertainty (the agent knows the true value of εi whereas 
the principal only knows its distribution), and this asymmetry justifies the delegation of 
authority.  The idea is that the worker frequently has more accurate information than does 
the manager about the idiosyncrasies of the production process.  For example, a line 
worker is more likely to know whether the particular machine he operates is about to 
break down and lead to a production bottleneck (i.e., supply variability) than the plant 
manager.  Likewise, a sales clerk would be better informed concerning customers’ 
impressions about a new product (i.e., demand variability) than would be the store 
manager.  Even when there is a considerable flow of information from worker to 
manager, the worker frequently has an informational advantage by virtue of being closer 
to the production process.1  Moreover, this informational advantage is likely to become 
more pronounced when the variance in output is large.   
Prendergast shows that when σ2 is sufficiently low the principal assigns the agent 
a task and compensates using an input-based contract, whereas when σ2 is sufficiently 
                                                 
1
 The argument that the agent should receive more authority the greater is his informational advantage was 
formalized by Aoki (1986).  Jensen and Meckling (1992) analyze how the decentralization of decision 
rights to agents with specific knowledge and abilities increases efficiency and explain that these decision 
rights should be accompanied by a control mechanism such as pay-for-performance in order to motivate 
individuals to use their decision rights optimally.  See also Dessein (2002) for a discussion of recent trends 
in firms pushing decision rights lower in their organizational hierarchies in order to profit from the local 
knowledge possessed by lower level managers.  Since the 1990s, many firms have been decentralizing 
decision rights, including AT&T, General Electric, Motorola and Ford.   
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high the principal allows the agent to choose the task but compensates using an output-
based contract.  The result arises because Prendergast assumes that the agent is risk-
neutral.  If agents are risk-averse, the usual risk-incentives tradeoff from the standard 
agency model is also present, so that the net effect of risk on incentives is ambiguous in 
sign.    
Our focus in this paper is on testing Prendergast’s proposed theoretical 
explanation for the mixed empirical support for the risk-incentives tradeoff that is 
documented in Table 1.  Our data are particularly well suited for testing Prendergast’s 
model, given the availability of an authority measure that closely matches the notion of 
authority discussed by Prendergast.  While his model is one of the earliest and probably 
the best known in this literature, alternative theoretical approaches for explaining the 
empirical puzzle have been proposed (e.g., Zabojnik 1996, Core and Qian 2002, Baker 
and Jorgensen 2003, Raith 2003, Oyer 2004, Adams 2005, Raith 2005, Serfes 2005, Shi 
2005).  Many of these alternative theories do not concern issues of delegation of authority 
and, more importantly, some of them are based on ideas that our data are ill-equipped to 
address (e.g. distinguishing between alternative types of risk), so we do not address them 
in this paper.  However, we see these alternative theories as important areas for future 
research, and we also stress that support for Prendergast’s model, as we find in this paper, 
in no way casts doubt on the validity of these alternative theories.  In the remainder of 
this section, we briefly survey the alternative theories. 2      
Rather than focusing on delegation of authority, Zabojnik (1996) and Baker and 
Jorgenson (2003) emphasize a distinction between two different types of risk.  One type 
                                                 
2
 It is also possible, of course, that there are factors other than those considered in these theories which are 
correlated with delegation, such as skill, pay, or how crucial the worker’s role is within the firm, that are 
the true source of the positive relationship between risk and incentives.   
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reflects the uncertainty afflicting both the principal and the agent symmetrically modeled 
in the standard principal-agent model.  The other type reflects uncertainty that is resolved 
(for the agent but not the principal) before the agent chooses an action.  Even with risk-
averse agents the slope of the optimal linear incentive contract may be increasing as the 
amount of the second type of risk in the production environment increases.  One 
appealing feature of this alternative approach is that, since it does not involve issues of 
delegation, it provides a more natural explanation than Prendergast’s for thinking about 
the relationship between risk and CEO incentives, since there is likely to be little 
variation in the amount of delegation to the CEO from the board.  Another appealing 
feature of this approach is that it predicts the simultaneous use of both input-based and 
output-based pay, whereas Prendergast’s model (taken literally) implies that 
compensation is either entirely input-based or entirely output-based.  Unfortunately, we 
are unable to address the predictions of these models using the WERS data, since we 
cannot distinguish empirically between the two different types of risk. 
Raith (2003) combines a principal-agent model with a model of oligopolistic price 
competition among firms, and shows that the presence of competition among firms can 
lead to a positive relationship between the variance in firm profits and incentive pay.  The 
idea is that there is a positive relationship between market competition and variance of 
firm profits, and a positive relationship between competition and incentive provision to 
induce workers to find ways to cut firm costs.  It would be possible to address Raith’s 
(2003) model using the WERS98, and that would be a useful objective for future work.  
Oyer (2004) distinguishes between two types of volatility:  variance of shocks 
common to all firms, and variance of the profits of the individual firm (idiosyncratic 
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volatility).  His model predicts that a greater common shock variance or a less volatile 
idiosyncratic shock increases the difficulty of replacing workers, making the adoption of 
incentive pay more likely.  To the extent that this notion of the degree of difficulty to 
replace workers complements delegation of authority, our results are consistent with 
Oyer’s prediction of a positive relationship between common shock variance and 
incentives. 
Shi’s (2005) model focuses on a particular type of agent who has already been 
delegated authority, the CEO.  When there is uncertainty about the state of the world to 
which the CEO has the ability to respond, the CEO can exert effort to collect information 
about the state of the world in order to make the correct decisions, which the board of 
directors promotes using incentive pay to the CEO.  This gives rise to a positive 
relationship between risk and incentives.  In essence, Shi’s model is quite similar to 
Prendergast’s (2002) except that “authority” is replaced with “ability to respond to risk”.  
While Shi has CEOs in mind, Prendergast’s (2002) model applies to workers more 
generally, and given that the WERS98 represents workers from many different 
occupations, we find it better suited to test Prendergast’s (2002) theory. 
Serfes (2005) introduces into the standard agency model endogenous matching 
between the principal and the agent and shows that a positive relationship between risk 
and incentives may arise when agents with high degrees of risk aversion are matched 
with low risk principals:  an increase in risk attracts an agent with lower risk aversion, 
which puts upward pressure on incentives.  We cannot address this model empirically, 
since the WERS98 lacks information on a worker’s degree of risk aversion. 
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Core and Qian (2002) propose an agency model in which the agent must be 
motivated to expend two types of effort:  productive effort required for working on the 
firm’s existing projects, and evaluation effort required to gauge the profitability of new 
and possibly risky projects.  When there is greater uncertainty about the success of new 
projects, the firm increases its use of incentive pay to encourage the worker to choose 
optimally.  The notion of project selection by agents can be interpreted as delegation of 
decision-making authority to agents:  the agent evaluates a new project and then must 
decide whether to accept or reject it.  The agent uses his private information and 
discretion here.  However, unlike Prendergast (2002), Core and Qian never consider the 
alternative situation in which the principal does not delegate project selection rights to the 
manager (i.e. the situation in which the principal himself makes the decision of whether 
to accept or reject a new project).  Core and Qian are motivated by incentive provision to 
CEOs, which explains why they focus on motivating the manager to choose the correct 
(productive) projects despite the risk involved, and neglect the presence vs. absence of 
that decision right in the first place.  Testing Core and Qian’s theory would require one to 
distinguish what proportion of a worker’s pay-for-performance is based on the agent’s 
effort on the firm’s existing projects and his effort on the evaluation of new projects (or 
more generally to distinguish between worker actions that increase firm profits as 
opposed to worker actions that increase the volatility of firm profits), and unfortunately 
the WERS does not have a breakdown of tasks performed by workers. 
The only alternative theories we are aware of which derive a positive relationship 
between risk and incentives while incorporating the delegation of worker authority are 
Adams (2005) and Raith (2005).  In Adams’ (2005) model, for workers with discretion 
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over task selection, the firm places greater value on incentive pay when it is difficult to 
monitor the worker’s private information, and if uncertainty in the demand for the firm’s 
product has a greater effect on the ability of the firm to monitor the worker’s information 
than it does on firm profits, greater uncertainty is associated with greater use of incentive 
pay.  We discuss the extent to which our results are consistent with Adams’ (2005) later 
in our paper.  In Raith’s (2005) analysis, whether the relationship between risk and 
incentives is positive or negative depends on the source of uncertainty:  the first source of 
uncertainty is noise in the principal’s measure of the agent’s output and leads to lower 
delegation and lower incentives, while the second source of uncertainty is the variance in 
the agents task productivities and implies higher delegation and higher incentives (this 
second prediction is similar to Prendergast’s (2002) main result).  Unfortunately, we are 
unable to fully address Raith’s model using the WERS data because these data do not 
contain information on the extent of the first type of uncertainty, as well as a number of 
other key controls such as the quality of the agent’s knowledge in Raith’s model.  
However, the results in this paper are consistent with Raith’s prediction of a positive 
relationship between the second type of uncertainty in his model and incentive pay.   
 
III. DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Our sample is drawn from both the management and worker questionnaires in the 
1998 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), jointly sponsored by the 
Department of Trade and Industry, ACAS, the Economic and Social Research Council, 
and the Policy Studies Institute.  Distributed via the UK Data Archive, the WERS data 
are a nationally representative stratified random sample covering British workplaces with 
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at least ten employees, except for those in the following 1992 Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) divisions: agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing; mining and 
quarrying; private households with employed persons; and extra-territorial organizations.  
Some of the 3192 workplaces targeted were found to be out of scope, and the final 
sample size of 2191 implies a net response rate of 80.4% (Cully et al., 1999) after 
excluding the out-of-scope cases.  Data were collected between October 1997 and June 
1998 via face-to-face interviews.  The respondent in the management questionnaire was 
usually the most senior manager at the workplace with responsibility for employment 
relations.  In addition, a random sample of up to 25 workers per establishment was 
surveyed, producing the responses for the worker questionnaire.   
 
Incentive Pay  
 In the principal-agent model, the firm consists of a single worker whose 
individual output (or net revenue) coincides with that of the firm.  Taken literally, the 
model abstracts from some relevant details of the workplace, such as the fact that most 
firms are comprised of more than one worker, and a broader interpretation is therefore 
required if the theory is to be helpful in understanding behavior in a large sample of 
employers.  In practice, employers rarely design incentive compensation systems tailored 
to the characteristics of individual workers.  In the typical workplace, the employer 
designs the incentive pay system to apply to broad groups of workers (such as all workers 
within an establishment or perhaps all workers in a particular occupation within the 
establishment) rather than an individual worker.  Thus, from the standpoint of empirical 
work that aims to test the theory, a measure of pay-for-performance at the level of the 
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establishment or perhaps a particular occupation within an establishment (as opposed to 
the level of the individual worker) is appropriate.  We use the following measure: 
Performance Pay = 1 if any workers at the establishment receive payments or dividends 
                                   from individual or group performance-related schemes 
       = 0 otherwise3,4 
 
 In Appendix A we consider an alternative measure of performance pay, equaling 
1 if any workers in the establishment’s largest occupational group receive incentive pay, 
and 0 otherwise.  An advantage of this alternative measure is that it requires that 
incentive pay be sufficiently prevalent in the establishment that it is used for a relatively 
large group of workers, if the establishment is to be classified as using incentive pay, and 
for that reason it might be argued that the measure is better than Performance Pay.  At 
the same time, the risk measure we use is not specific to the establishment’s largest 
occupational group, so we think the most conservative approach is to use Performance 
Pay to produce our main results.  Nonetheless, using this alternative measure we find 
even stronger empirical support for the first and fourth questions we pose at the end of 
the Introduction than we find using Performance Pay.  See Table A2 and the last two 
paragraphs of Appendix A. 
                                                 
3
 The wording of the question permits group-based as well as individual-based schemes, whereas the 
relevant theories pertain to individual-based schemes.  This does not present a problem for our analysis.  
The majority of establishments reporting pay-for-performance use individual-based schemes in our data, 
and restricting the incentive pay measure to equal one only when it is certain that individual-based 
performance pay is used yields results very similar to those we report here (see Appendix A). 
4
 In the principal-agent model the relevant notion of incentive pay is a linear piece rate, or fraction of the 
agent’s compensation that is output based.  In contrast, our binary measure of performance pay describes 
whether performance-related pay is used at all, providing no information on its intensity.  This poses no 
problems for our analysis, since we have a large sample of establishments with plenty of variation in the 
use of incentive pay, though more detailed data on the fraction of compensation that is incentive-based 
within each establishment would be even more informative.  We also note that, from the standpoint of 
testing Prendergast’s specific model, our binary measure actually matches the theory better than would a 
measure of the fraction of pay within the establishment that is incentives-based.  The reason is that the 
prediction of Prendergast’s model (taken literally) is that the principal chooses either output-based pay or 
input-based pay and never a mix of the two.   
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Risk or Uncertainty 
In the principal-agent model, the agent’s output or net revenue (which equals the 
output or net revenue of the entire single-worker firm) is determined both by the agent’s 
effort level and by a stochastic component.  The variance of the stochastic component of 
output is referred to as risk or uncertainty.  From the standpoint of empirical tests the 
relevant measure of risk is not stochastic variation in an individual worker’s output but 
rather output variance at a broader level.  For concreteness, consider the piece-rate 
system used to compensate the installers of automobile windshields at Safelite Glass 
Corporation.  There are many random factors specific to an individual worker that affect 
the worker’s output (for example, the worker’s health or attitude on a given day, or 
whether the worker was kept awake all night by a barking dog).  While in principle the 
individual output variability introduced by these factors could be used by Safelite to tailor 
a specific piece rate scheme to each worker, this is not what happens in practice.  Instead, 
Safelite designs a “one size fits all” piece-rate scheme that is applied uniformly to all 
workers.  Thus, it is not individual-specific risks that the firm insures workers against 
when designing the compensation system but rather broader market-level risks that are 
expected to influence the outputs of larger groups of workers.  Our measure is as follows:  
Risk = 1 if the current state of the market for the main product or service of the 
  establishment is described as “turbulent” 
        = 0 otherwise  
 
Assuming the size of the market faced by the establishment is closely tied to output, as is 
reasonable to expect in equilibrium, turbulence or uncertainty with respect to the size of 
the market reflects the concept of risk envisioned in agency theory.  
13 
 
 One advantage our subjective risk measure offers and that is worth emphasizing 
is that, in contrast to the objective risk measures used in many of the studies summarized 
in Table 1, it is unlikely to be directly affected by employer behavior (and therefore 
endogenous).5  For example, in the large body of work on executive pay, the risk measure 
is frequently variance in firm accounting returns, stock returns, operating profits, or sales, 
all of which are subject to CEO influence, and in the studies of sharecropped farms, the 
measures of risk include variance in farm profits, variance in crop yield per acre, and type 
of crop, all of which are subject to the farmer's influence.   
 
Worker Authority  
Prendergast (2002) draws a key “distinction between instances in which an 
employer tells his agent what to work on and situations in which the agent is given 
discretion over the activities that he spends time on. [emphasis added]” (p. 1072)  
Prendergast’s notion of authority therefore corresponds to delegating workers the power 
to make their own decisions about which tasks to perform.6  The WERS worker survey 
contains a question that closely corresponds to this notion.  At each establishment, up to 
25 workers are randomly sampled and asked the following question:    
“In general, how much influence do you have about the range of tasks you do in your 
job?”  Responses are recorded on a four-point scale (1 = “none”, 2 = “a little”, 3 = 
“some”, 4 = “a lot”).  We code all responses of “don’t know” as missing.  Since our 
                                                 
5
 The point that the risk measures used in the previous literature can be affected by managerial behavior has 
been noted in Bushman et al. (1996), Lafontaine (1992), Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya (1995), and Foss 
and Laursen (2005). 
 
6
 Other studies that formalize the notion of the delegation of authority in the agency framework include 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Al-Najjar (2001). 
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measures of incentive pay, risk, and firm characteristics are measured at the 
establishment level, for the authority measure we aggregate the worker authority 
responses to the establishment level by taking the modal worker response.  The idea is 
that the most frequently occurring worker response to the authority questions within an 
establishment reflects the degree of authority experienced by the typical worker in that 
establishment.  We use the following four-valued authority measure and the four binary 
indicators implied by it:7 
Authority = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “none” 
                = 2 if establishment’s modal worker response is “a little” 
                = 3 if establishment’s modal worker response is “some” 
                = 4 if establishment’s modal worker response is “a lot”   
Authority1 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “none” 
                  = 0 otherwise 
Authority2 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “a little” 
                  = 0 otherwise 
Authority3 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “some” 
                  = 0 otherwise 
Authority4 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response is “a lot” 
                  = 0 otherwise 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The “risk” question was only asked of establishments in the trading sector, 
producing 1591 responses.8  Of these, 1590 establishments responded to the questions 
about performance-related pay.  Descriptive statistics for all variables in our analysis are 
displayed in Table 2 for the analysis sample of 1590 establishments.  In Table 2 and in all 
of our analysis we use establishment weights; in most cases worker weights yield the 
same qualitative results.  Some of the variables in our analysis contain missing values, 
and we estimate all of our models using listwise deletion.  The main source of missing 
                                                 
7
 In Appendix A we consider some alternative measures of authority.  
8
 The WERS defines the trading sector as the private sector, plus trading government corporations and 
nationalized industries. 
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information is the measure of worker authority, since only 1277 of the 1590 
establishments reported any worker responses to the authority question.9  Our analyses 
include controls for firm characteristics, and we define these in Appendix B.  In the 
following subsections we address the four questions posed at the end of the Introduction.   
 
A. Is there empirical support for the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by agency theory? 
To investigate whether a tradeoff between risk and incentives can be identified in 
the WERS data, we estimate the following probit model: 
Prob(Performance Payi = 1) = Φ(αRiski + Xiβ)   
where Xi is a vector of controls for firm characteristics, and i indexes establishments.  
Agency theory predicts α < 0, and we find support for this prediction.  As seen in Table 3, 
the estimated α is negative, though it is statistically significant only at the ten percent 
level on a one-tailed test.10  The implied change in the predicted probability that incentive 
pay is offered when Risk increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating other covariates at their 
means) is -0.057.  This magnitude is substantial, given that the mean of Performance Pay 
is 0.196.  On average, an increase in Risk from 0 to 1 is associated with a decrease of 29 
percent in the predicted probability that performance-related pay is used.11  
 
                                                 
9
 A table of means on this smaller subsample of N = 1277 matches Table 2 very closely. 
10
 Since the negative relationship between risk and incentives predicted by the principal-agent model is a 
directional hypothesis, we use one-tailed hypothesis tests as the basis for declaring results statistically 
significant.  We adhere to this convention throughout the paper whenever a directional hypothesis is 
implied by the theory. 
 
11
 Since the binary risk measure is a subjective response, it is subject to potential classification errors, and 
we investigated the sensitivity of the estimated α to such errors using likelihood-based methods (Carroll, et 
al. 2006), finding that the parameter of interest, α, was relatively insensitive to such errors. 
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B. Is there empirical support for Prendergast’s assumption that worker authority and 
incentives are positively related?  
A key assumption underlying Prendergast’s model is that authority and incentives 
are positively related.12  This is because in risky settings the principal wants to switch 
from monitoring labor inputs to monitoring outputs.  In such settings, the firm delegates 
decision-making authority to the worker but accompanies this authority with output-
based pay.  To test this assumption empirically, we estimate the following probit model:13 
Prob(Performance Payi = 1) = Φ(β2Authority2i + β3Authority3i + β4Authority4i + Xiβ).  
Empirical support for a positive correlation between authority and incentives would be 
implied by positive and statistically significant estimates of β2, β3, and β4.  As seen in 
Table 4, a positive relationship between authority and incentives is supported in the data.  
While the estimates of β2 and β3 are statistically indistinguishable from zero, the 
estimated β4 is positive and significant at the five percent level on a one-tailed test.   
 The WERS also contains retrospective information on changes in incentive pay 
and authority over time.  Respondent managers who were in establishments that had been 
in operation for at least five years at the time of the survey were presented with a list of 
                                                 
12
 A number of empirical studies find such a relationship.  MacLeod and Parent (1999) use a cross-firm, 
cross-industry data set to show that jobs using high-powered incentives, namely either piece rate or 
commission contracts, are associated with greater worker authority than are hourly paid or salaried jobs.  
Nagar (2002) analyzes the retail banking industry, finding that branch managers with more authority 
receive more incentive based pay.  Wulf (2006) looks at a panel of 250 publicly traded U.S. firms and finds 
that the pay of division managers with broader authority, i.e., those designated as corporate officers like 
president, CFO, principal accounting officer or VP, is more sensitive to firm sales growth than division 
managers who are not officers (though there is no difference in terms of sensitivity to division sales 
growth).  Foss and Laursen (2005) find a positive correlation between performance pay and delegation in a 
cross section of 993 Danish firms surveyed in 1996. 
13
 Both authority and incentives are chosen by the principal in pursuit of higher profit and are therefore 
endogenous.  Since these variables are jointly determined, there is no reason to prefer incentives over 
authority as a dependent variable, and an alternative way to address Prendergast’s first key assumption 
would be to estimate an ordered probit, with an authority measure as the dependent variable and the 
dummy variable for incentive pay as an independent variable.  We defer a discussion of the endogeneity of 
authority to later in the section, where we extend our main test of Prendergast’s model to treat authority as 
endogenous.  
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items, and for each item they were asked if there had been any change at the 
establishment within the last five years, as well as how substantial the change had been.  
The following two items pertain to performance-related pay and degree of worker 
authority:  “The proportion of pay for non-managerial employees which is related to 
measures of performance” and “The amount of employee influence over the way they do 
their job.”14  Responses to both items were on a five-point scale:  “gone down a lot”, 
“gone down a little”, “stayed the same”, “gone up a little”, “gone up a lot”.  Since only a 
small number of respondents reported that either of these items went down during the last 
five years, we aggregate the lowest 3 categories.  That is, we create a dependent variable, 
∆Performance PayNM, capturing the “increase in incentive pay during last five years”, 
defined as “1 = stayed the same or gone down”, “2 = gone up a little”, “3 = gone up a 
lot”.  For changes in authority we create three dummy variables (∆Authority1, 
∆Authority2, ∆Authority3) corresponding to the categories “stayed the same or gone 
down”, “gone up a little”, and “gone up a lot.”  We then estimate an ordered probit with 
the incentives measure as the dependent variable, including the authority dummies and 
the controls for firm characteristics.  Results are displayed in Table 5 and strongly 
support a positive relationship between incentive pay and authority.  Increases in the 
degree of worker authority during the last five years are strongly positively related to 
increases in the fraction of non-managerial pay that is performance-based.   
 
                                                 
14
 In fact, Prendergast’s model, taken literally, implies no predictions about the proportion of the agent’s 
pay that is performance-related.  In his model the principal chooses to pay the agent either on an output-
based or an input-based scheme.  Nonetheless, the basic logic of Prendergast’s argument should extend to 
the proportion of compensation that is output-based. 
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C. Is there empirical support for Prendergast’s assumption that risk and delegation of 
authority are positively related? 
The second key assumption underlying the Prendergast model is that delegation 
of authority is more likely in risky settings, so that authority and risk are positively 
related.15  To test this empirically, we estimate an ordered probit model in which the four-
valued dependent variable is Authority, and Risk is the key independent variable.  The 
results, displayed in Table 6, reveal a positive coefficient on Risk that is statistically 
significant at the five percent level.16  These results clearly support Prendergast’s 
assumption that risk and authority are positively related.   
D. Is there empirical support for the main testable implication of Prendergast’s model? 
 Prendergast argues that if controls for worker authority are added to risk-
incentives regressions, evidence favoring a negative relationship between risk and 
                                                 
15
 Informal observations from certain production environments suggest that authority and risk are positively 
related.  For example, Prendergast (2002) notes that “the most likely place to observe data on the correlates 
of agents’ responsibilities is in the franchising literature; franchisees are offered more responsibilities than 
the managers of company-owned stores.  This theory suggests that the decision to franchise (and hence 
delegate responsibility to the agent) will be positively correlated with uncertainty” (p. 1098).  Lafontaine 
(1992) finds that the decision to franchise is significantly and positively related to her measure of 
uncertainty, the likelihood of bankruptcy.  A positive relationship between authority and risk has also been 
found in the disparate settings of sharecropped farms and retail banking.  In a comparison of rice and 
tobacco farmers in Andhra Pradesh, India, Rao (1971) found that rice farms, which are characterized by 
significantly less uncertainty than tobacco farms in terms of crop yield volatility, are more likely to be 
sharecropped than leased out using fixed rental contracts.  Since sharecroppers hold less decision-making 
power than do renters of farms, this can be interpreted as evidence of a positive relationship between risk 
and authority in an agency framework.  Finally, using data on branch manager practices from 100 U.S. 
retail banks, Nagar (2002) found evidence that banks that face greater uncertainty in terms of volatility in 
earnings and bank growth tend to delegate more authority to branch managers.  Also, Foss and Laursen 
(2005) find a positive relationship between risk and authority in a survey of 993 Danish firms sampled in 
1996.     
16
 Changes in the predicted probabilities, as the binary covariate increase from zero to one, for all four 
discrete outcomes for worker authority (ordered from the lowest to highest) are as follows: -0.035, -0.030,  
-0.059, 0.124, where the other covariates are evaluated at their means.  Thus, an increase in Risk from 0 to 
1 is associated with an increase in the predicted probability that the degree of worker authority is reported 
to be “a lot” and decreases in the predicted probabilities that it assumes any of the three lower values 
(corresponding to responses of “some, “a little” or “none”). 
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incentives should strengthen.  As a starting point we augment the model in Table 3 with 
controls for worker authority as follows: 
Prob(Performance Payi = 1) = Φ(αRiski + β2Authority2i + β3Authority3i + β4Authority4i + Xiβ)  
Prendergast’s argument suggests that α should decrease when authority controls are 
added to the model.  Table 7 displays the results, which support this prediction.  The 
coefficient of Risk decreases from -0.30 (Z = 1.48) to -0.38 (Z = 1.78) when authority 
controls are added to the model.  The difference in Risk coefficients between the two 
models is statistically significant at the ten percent level on a one-tailed test (p-value = 
0.052).  Furthermore, the estimate of β4 is positive and statistically significant, confirming 
the positive relationship between authority and incentive pay that we documented in 
Subsection B.  The other two authority coefficients are also positive, though they are 
statistically insignificant. 
 The results thus far appear supportive of the main testable implication of 
Prendergast’s model.  However, to address the potential concern that authority is 
endogenous, we estimate a simultaneous-equations model of incentives and authority, 
allowing for correlation between the unobserved determinants of both variables.  It is 
convenient to aggregate the authority measure from four categories to three by combining 
the two lowest responses (i.e. “none” and “a little”), as follows:  
AUTHORITYRANGE(W)1 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
worker discretion over the range of tasks done on the job is “   
none” or “a little” (= 0 otherwise)  
AUTHORITYRANGE(W)2 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
worker discretion over the range of tasks done on the job 
is“some” (= 0 otherwise) 
AUTHORITYRANGE(W)3 = 1 if establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
                     worker discretion over the range of tasks done on the job is “a 
                                           lot” (= 0 otherwise) 
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This aggregation reduces the number of discrete states in the simultaneous equations 
model from eight to six.  We include “(W)” in the variable name to emphasize that these 
measures reflect worker perceptions.  
 Letting Yi* and Ai* denote latent indexes reflecting the propensity of 
establishment i to offer performance-related pay and to delegate authority, respectively, 
and letting Yi, A1i, A2i, and A3i denote the binary realizations of performance-related pay 
and the three levels of worker authority (“none” or “a little”, “some”, and “a lot”), our 
model is: 
Yi* = αRiski + β2A2i + β3A3i + Xiδ + ε1i   (4.1) 
Ai* = γRiski + Wiλ + ε2i    (4.2) 
Yi = 1 if Yi* ≥ 0 
     = 0 if Yi* < 0 
A1i = 1 if Ai* ≤ 0 
      = 0 if Ai* > 0 
A2i = 1 if 0 < Ai* ≤ c 
      = 0 otherwise 
A3i = 1 if Ai* > c 
      = 0 otherwise 
where c > 0.  We assume the joint distribution of disturbances is bivariate normal, so (ε1i, 
ε2i) ~ BVN(0,0,1,1,ρ).  The model implies the following six possible outcomes: 
                         Six Possible Discrete Realizations of (Yi, A1i, A2i, A3i) 
Probability Yi = A1i = A2i = A3i= 
P1i(θ) 1 1 0 0 
P2i(θ) 1 0 1 0 
P3i(θ) 1 0 0 1 
P4i(θ) 0 1 0 0 
P5i(θ) 0 0 1 0 
P6i(θ) 0 0 0 1 
Let Zji = 1 if workplace i experiences the jth outcome 
           = 0 otherwise, for i = 1, 2, … , N and j = 1, 2, …, 6 
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Then the log-likelihood function is PZ ji
N
i j jii
L log
1
6
1
∑∑
= =
= ω  where ωi is the sampling 
weight for establishment i, and the weights are scaled to sum to N.17 
To facilitate identification, the vector of controls Wi includes some additional 
variables not contained in Xi.  The WERS employee survey asks each of the workers (up 
to 25 per establishment) how long they have been employed at the establishment.  
Responses are recorded as a few discrete indicators for ranges of years.  In each 
establishment we select the workers who provided the modal response to the authority 
question.  For this subsample of workers we compute the fraction of workers with job 
tenures of less than one year, the fraction with tenures of at least one year but less than 
two years, and the fraction with tenures of at least two years but less than five years.  We 
include these three indicator variables in Wi, so the excluded category is the fraction with 
job tenures of five years or more.  The rationale is that workers who have been with the 
establishment for only a short time are likely to be granted less authority over the range 
of tasks performed than workers who have been with the establishment for a long time.  
So the longer the average tenure for the group of workers providing the modal response 
to the authority question, the lower the modal authority response should be.  While the 
                                                 
17
 Since both endogenous variables are observed only discretely, each of the 6 probabilities Pji(θ) is a 
double integral of the bivariate normal density f(ε1i, ε2i).  Suppressing all subscripts i, and letting K denote 
αRiski + β2A2i + β3A3i + Xiδ, the expression for P1i(θ) is as follows:   
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job tenure variables can be expected to predict the degree of authority granted to those 
particular workers, they should not predict whether the establishment as a whole uses 
performance-related pay.18     
 We estimate equations (4.1) and (4.2) jointly by maximum likelihood.  Table 8 
displays the estimation results for equation (4.1) under various sets of imposed 
constraints.  In columns 1 and 2 we impose ρ = 0, whereas in columns 3 and 4 we treat ρ 
as a free parameter; thus, columns 1 and 2 treat worker authority as exogenous whereas 
columns 3 and 4 treat authority as endogenous.  In columns 1 and 3 we impose β2 = β3 = 
0 (that is, we exclude the authority variables from the right-hand side) whereas in 
columns 2 and 4 we include the authority variables, estimating β2 and β3.  Thus, 
comparing columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) gives the test of the main implication of 
Prendergast’s model for the case of exogenous (endogenous) worker authority.   
 When authority is treated as endogenous, adding authority variables to the right-
hand side of a risk-incentives probit decreases the risk coefficient from -0.30 (Z = 3.96) 
to -0.35 (Z = 1.633).  Furthermore, when authority variables are included, they are 
positive and (for the dummy variable corresponding to the greatest degree of worker 
authority) statistically significant.19  Qualitatively these results match those that we found 
when worker authority was treated as exogenous.  The estimated value of ρ is 0.29, 
                                                 
18
 Since the model is nonlinear the exclusion restrictions can be tested.  If the simultaneous-equations 
model is estimated with these 3 dummy variables included in the incentive pay equation as well as the 
authority equation, a likelihood ratio test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 3 variables have 
coefficients of zero in the incentive pay equation (p-value = 0.285). 
19
 We also note that the variables unique to the authority equation are related to authority in the manner we 
expected.  The only one that is statistically significant is the fraction of workers providing the modal 
response to the authority question with at least one year but less than two years of job tenure.  The 
coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant (Z = 1.77), indicating that increases in 
this fraction (relative to the fraction with five or more years of tenure with the establishment) are associated 
with a lower degree of worker authority.  The other two tenure variables included in Wi are far from 
statistically significant.   
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suggesting a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of performance 
pay and the degree of authority delegated to workers.  However, it is far from statistically 
significant (Z = 0.56).  Thus, the null hypothesis that ρ = 0 cannot be rejected.  This 
means that in the empirical tests it is reasonable to use a comparison of columns 1 and 2 
as the basis for evaluating the main testable prediction of Prendergast’s model, even 
though in the theoretical model authority is endogenous.  Our conclusion is that including 
authority variables in a risk-incentives probit strengthens the negative relationship 
between risk and incentives, supporting Prendergast’s main testable implication. 
We conclude this section with a discussion of Foss and Laursen (2005), the 
previous study that is closest to ours in its objectives.20  Their study is based on 993 
                                                 
20
 Three other studies are also related to our analysis in that they incorporate authority into empirical 
models of risk and incentives.  Wulf (2007) uses a panel of 250 publicly-traded U.S. firms to show that in 
the presence of a control for whether division managers have officer status (such as president, CFO, VP) 
the tradeoff between division-level risk and manager incentives is stronger than when the control is 
omitted.  This result is consistent with the notion of authority as a mitigating factor in the risk-incentives 
relationship.  However, one aspect of the analysis that makes it somewhat difficult to interpret this as a 
direct test of Prendergast’s main implication is that the set of covariates in the regressions which omit 
authority are different from those that include authority.  
Using a cross section of 100 retail banks in the U.S., Nagar (2002) finds that, holding constant the 
authority delegated from top bank management to branch managers (in terms of hiring, promotions, hours 
and investment decisions), there is a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between uncertainty 
(as proxied by volatility in earnings and bank growth) and incentive pay (as reflected by the proportion of 
bank managers’ pay comprised of bonuses).  Since that study does not estimate models that omit authority, 
we are unable to make a comparison of the relation between risk and uncertainty when authority is 
controlled as opposed to when it is not, so the study does not provide a test of Prendergast’s main 
implication.   
Finally, Adams (2005) analyzes the manufacturing establishments from the 1998 WERS (a 
subsample of 166 establishments of the 1590 we consider).  Adams treats the unit of observation as the 
worker rather than the establishment, but incentive pay is not observed in the 1998 WERS at the level of 
individual workers, so he attempts to infer the measure using establishment-level questions about what 
fraction of the workers in the given worker’s occupation receives either profit-related pay or ESOPs (if 
more than 80% of the workers receive such payments, the given worker is assumed to receive it, if less than 
20% of the workers receive such payments, the given worker is assumed not to receive it, and if between 
20% and 80% of the workers receive such payments, the given worker is dropped from the sample).  In 
principle, this approach could misclassify 100 percent of the cases.  Furthermore, the central question of 
interest concerns the relationship between risk and incentives, and the risk measure available in the WERS 
only varies across establishments and not across workers within an establishment.  So for the purpose of 
measuring the risk-incentives tradeoff, no additional information comes from disaggregating to the worker 
level, since this parameter is identified only by variation across establishments.  Finally, Adams’ measure 
of performance pay (a hybrid of profit-sharing and ESOP) is a group scheme, whereas our measure of 
individual-based performance pay more closely matches the theory.  We also note that Adams’s main 
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Danish firms sampled in 1996.  Their performance-pay measure is given by the question 
“How large a share of the firm’s workforce is involved in performance pay?”  Their 
authority measure is given by the question “How large a share of the firm’s workforce is 
involved in delegation of responsibility?”  Responses to both questions are (none, < 25 
percent, 25 – 50 percent, or > 50 percent).  They refer to their risk measure as “within-
industry variance in profitability”.  To construct this variable, the authors assign each 
firm in their sample to one of 70 industry categories.  Within each of these 70 groups, the 
authors compute the variance of firm profits, calculated using only those firms with non-
missing profit data in each of the years 1992, 1993, and 1994.  Each firm’s value for the 
risk measure is the variance that was computed for all firms belonging to the same 
industry category, so that the risk variable in their analysis assumes only 70 possible 
values.  They then estimate an ordered probit model using incentive pay as the dependent 
variable and the 70-valued risk measure as an independent variable, along with a set of 
controls.21 
To understand the correct interpretation of the risk-incentives relationship 
estimated in this empirical model, it is useful to consider first a more general empirical 
specification that nests the Foss and Laursen model.  The general model includes on the 
right-hand side 70 industry dummies and the set of control variables used by Foss and 
                                                                                                                                                 
measure of risk (a dummy equaling 1 if the current state of the market is increasing or decreasing as well as 
turbulent) seems to us less natural than the one we use.  
 
21
 The controls include firm size, 3 sector dummies, a dummy for whether the firm is a subsidiary, the 
extent to which the firm is innovative, and the perceived change in the level of competition.  The authors 
interpret the last 2 variables in this list as alternative measures of risk rather than as controls.  However, we 
prefer to focus on their measure based on the variance of profitability when interpreting their results, since 
we see this concept as more direct and closely tied to risk than either of the alternative measures, despite 
the concern that it is subject to employer influence (and therefore endogenous), unlike our measure.  The 
authors also acknowledge that this measure “is the more conventional measure of uncertainty used in the 
existing literature.” (p. 253)    
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Laursen, but it excludes their risk measure.  For the purpose of explaining variation in the 
use of incentive pay across firms in a cross section, including a full set of industry 
dummies would be quite a natural approach to take given that we expect the incidence of 
incentive pay to vary across industries for many reasons, so the general model would be a 
useful starting point for analyzing the data.  The coefficients on the industry dummies in 
this general model would capture the effects of a wide array of factors (including, but not 
limited to, risk in the production environment) specific to each of the 70 industries.  Next, 
suppose that 70 parametric restrictions are imposed on this general model, so that the 
ratio of every pair of coefficients on the industry dummies is constrained to equal a 
constant that the researcher specifies (in particular, this constant is the ratio of the within-
industry variances in profit for the particular pair of industries).  Implicit in these 70 
restrictions is the strong assumption that the coefficients of each industry dummy reflect 
the effect of risk and nothing else.  Imposing the entire set of restrictions reduces the 70 
industry dummies to a single linear combination of these dummies, namely the risk 
variable used by Foss and Laursen, so that only one parameter (apart from those 
associated with the controls) is estimated rather than 70.  Since their model is a highly 
restricted version of the general model, one could test their restrictions simply by 
estimating the general model and comparing the ratios of each pair of estimated 
coefficients of the industry dummies to the particular values imposed on these parameters 
by Foss and Laursen.  We expect that the restrictions would be rejected, and we think that 
the variable that the authors interpret as a measure of risk in the production environment 
is better thought of as simply an arbitrary linear combination of industry dummies.  In 
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short, we think it is better to estimate the coefficients of industry dummies than to impose 
them a priori. 
Turning to their results, Foss and Laursen find positive and statistically significant 
relationships between risk and incentives, between risk and authority, and between 
authority and incentives.  Finally, if authority is added as a control to the risk-incentives 
(ordered probit) model, the estimated coefficient on risk remains positive and statistically 
significant but slightly diminishes in magnitude from 3.049 to 2.841.  The authors also 
aggregate the authority and incentives responses from 4 categories to 2 for the purpose of 
estimating a bivariate probit model that allows for correlation between the unobserved 
determinants of both outcomes.  Their results from the bivariate probit analysis are 
qualitatively the same as those just stated, with one exception.  Now, when authority is 
added as a control in the incentives equation, the risk coefficient drops considerably in 
magnitude (from 4.931 to 1.689) and loses statistical significance at conventional levels.  
The authors note, however, that this same qualitative result emerges if the two equations 
in the bivariate probit model are estimated separately, suggesting that the result is at least 
partially due to aggregating the authority and incentives measures from 4 categories to 2. 
These results support the following 3 hypotheses put forth by Foss and Laursen:  
H1: “There is an overall positive and significant relation between environmental 
uncertainty and the use of performance pay.” 
H2a: “Delegation and environmental uncertainty are positively correlated.” 
H2b: “After controlling for delegation, there will be no relationship between uncertainty 
and performance pay.”  
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Regarding H1, it is worth noting that while Prendergast’s model predicts a positive 
relationship between risk and incentives, this is only because his model assumes risk-
neutral agents, and he is careful to state that in the real world the standard theoretical 
channel of influence suggesting a negative relationship should also be present, as 
suggested by the mixed empirical evidence in Table 1.  Similarly, H2b is implied by 
Prendergast’s model only because of the assumption of risk-neutral agents.  If agents are 
risk-averse so that the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by traditional agency theory is 
present, then after controlling for delegation there will be a negative relationship between 
uncertainty and performance pay.   
 Given the strong maintained assumption of risk-neutral agents that underlies H1 
and H2b, the Foss and Laursen results might be interpreted as supportive of Prendergast’s 
model.  However, in the absence of this maintained assumption their results leave open 
the question of why the risk-incentives relationship in their models remains positive 
(though not statistically significant in the models that aggregate incentives and authority 
from 4 categories to 2) even after controlling for delegation.  One interpretation is that 
alternative theories to Prendergast’s (that have nothing to do with delegation of authority) 
play an important role in explaining the mixed nature of the empirical results in Table 1, 
so that even after controlling for delegation a negative risk-incentives relationship fails to 
emerge.  Another possible interpretation is that the nature of the authority measure does 
not allow a precise test of the implication of Predergast’s model.  The notion of the 
fraction of workers at the firm “involved in the delegation of responsibility” is rather 
vague and open to a variety of interpretations, and it is unclear to what extent it captures 
28 
 
the degree of authority over the range of tasks performed which is the central idea in 
Prendergast’s theory.   
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 In this study we use a large, nationally representative cross section of British 
establishments, containing responses both from employers and from multiple workers in 
each establishment, to shed light on the four empirical questions posed in the 
Introduction.  In answer to the first question, we find a negative relationship between risk 
and incentives as predicted by the standard principal-agent model.  On average, greater 
turbulence in the market for the establishment’s main product or service is associated 
with a lower probability of performance-related pay for the establishment as a whole.  In 
answer to the second and third questions, we find evidence supporting a positive 
relationship between performance-related pay and the degree of worker authority over the 
range of tasks performed, and evidence supporting a positive relationship between risk 
and the degree of worker authority.  Both are key assumptions of Prendergast’s (2002) 
theory. 
In answer to the fourth question, our results suggest that when measures of worker 
authority are included in a risk-incentives model, the evidence favoring a negative 
relationship between risk and incentives strengthens.  Since both key assumptions of 
Prendergast’s theory are supported in the data as well as its main testable implication, we 
interpret the overall evidence in this empirical test of his theory as supportive.  The 
evidence suggests that Prendergast’s theory is at least part of the reason why a vast 
empirical literature has failed to uncover the negative relationship between risk and 
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incentives that has been central to agency theory for nearly three decades.  We conclude 
with four comments. 
 First, while our results on the risk-incentives tradeoff represent only one study in 
a vast empirical literature that has found mixed evidence, we believe the breadth of our 
sample (which is nationally representative of all British establishments) makes our results 
particularly interesting.  As seen in Table 1, while many analyses of the risk-incentives 
tradeoff have been conducted, the heavy focus has been on a relatively small set of 
worker groups, in particular groups that, it is fair to say, are atypical.  For example, while 
the number of jobs held by either CEOs or sharecroppers is negligible, over half of the 
studies in Table 1 focus on these two groups.  The general point is that it is difficult to 
know what relative weights to assign to the rows of Table 1 in forming an overall 
evaluation.  We think the present study, based on a broad and nationally representative 
sample of establishments, contributes to forming such an overall evaluation.   
Second, an appealing feature of the analysis is that our risk measure is less subject 
to influence by agent behavior (and therefore endogenous) than the objective risk 
measures that are frequently used in this literature.  Endogeneity of empirical measures of 
risk presents another obstacle, in addition to the one cited in the previous paragraph, that 
hinders the extent to which the studies in Table 1 can be used as the basis for forming an 
overall evaluation of the empirical importance of the risk-incentives tradeoff.  
Third, we hope that our results will stimulate further research in this area using 
other data sets.  Since we have focused only on Britain, due to the strengths of the WERS 
data for testing Prendergast’s theory, it would be useful for future tests to use data from 
the United States and other countries.  While we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
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empirical support of Prendergast’s model is specific to Britain, we will be rather 
surprised if this is confirmed in future work.  We see nothing peculiar to Britain in the 
fundamental workplace issues Prendergast’s model addresses, and we therefore expect 
the empirical support for his model in Britain to generalize to data sets from other 
countries.  Furthermore, though our binary measure of incentive pay proved to be quite 
informative, more detailed information concerning how the intensity of incentive pay 
varies across organizations would also be interesting.   
 Finally, while we believe our results suggest that Prendergast’s theory at least 
partially explains why the empirical literature has failed to uncover a risk-incentives 
tradeoff, this does not rule out that alternative theories may also play a role.  Our focus on 
Prendergast’s theory in this analysis is driven largely by the availability of an authority 
measure that corresponds exactly to the notion discussed by Prendergast.  Though we 
believe our evidence is supportive of Prendergast’s theory, we do not see it as casting 
doubt on the alternative models, and we see investigation of these alternatives as a 
promising direction for future work with other data sets.   
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 APPENDIX A 
 
 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF INCENTIVE PAY AND AUTHORITY 
 
A potential drawback of our measure of incentive pay is that it refers to group 
performance-related schemes as well as individual performance-related schemes, whereas 
the theory we address in this paper pertains to individual performance-related schemes.  
To explore this issue, we use some further information in the WERS employer survey.  If 
the respondent reports that performance-related pay is used at the establishment and that 
“any non-managerial occupations [are] eligible”, the respondent is then asked what 
measures of performance are used to determine the amount of performance-related pay.  
Respondents can list as many of the following responses as they wish, in addition to 
providing their own responses not on the list: “1 = Individual performance / output”, “2 = 
Group or team performance / output”, “3 = Workplace-based measures”, “4 = 
Organisation-based measures”.  The most common response is “1”, either alone or in 
combination with other choices.  Using this information we modify the binary 
performance measure we have used throughout the analysis.  If an establishment reports 
the use of performance-related pay but does not include “1 = Individual performance / 
output” in its list of responses to the above question, we reclassify the binary 
performance pay measure for this observation from 1 to 0.  The idea behind this 
reclassification is to create a binary incentive pay measure that equals one only if it can 
be determined with certainty (abstracting from reporting and coding errors) that 
performance-related pay is used and at least some of it is based on individual 
performance or output. 
Two points are worth noting about this modified measure.  First, when the 
respondent lists more than one answer to the question of what type of performance-
related scheme is used at the establishment, there is no way to discern the relative 
importance of the responses listed.  Second, because the question is only asked if 
performance-pay is used and “any non-managerial occupations [are] eligible”, if 
performance pay is used at the establishment but no non-managerial occupations are 
eligible for it we have no information on what type of performance pay is used.  Thus, we 
only have information on the type of performance-related pay used for 357 of the 418 
establishments that report the use of performance-related pay.  For the remaining 61 
establishments we define the binary incentive measure as “1” even though in some of 
these cases the performance-pay might not be based on individual performance / output.   
The mean of the modified incentive pay measure is 0.151, as opposed to 0.196 for 
the unmodified measure we use throughout the paper.  Replicating all of our analysis in 
the paper using the modified measure, we obtain very similar results to those we report 
here, and none of our conclusions change qualitatively.  All of these results are available 
upon request. 
Although the measure of worker authority we use throughout the analysis exactly 
matches the notion described in Prendergast (2002), we also consider some alternative 
authority measures.  These are measures of worker discretion over how tasks are 
executed (as opposed to the range of tasks performed).  The questions are asked both of 
the employer and of the workers, allowing us to construct the following employer-
perceived and worker-perceived measures of authority over how tasks are executed:   
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Worker-Perceived Worker Authority Measures 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)1 = 1 if  the establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
worker discretion over how tasks are executed is “none” or “a little” 
                                     = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)2 = 1 if the establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
worker discretion over how tasks are executed is “some” 
                                     = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)3 = 1 if the establishment’s modal worker response to the amount of 
worker discretion over how tasks are executed is “a lot” 
                = 0 otherwise 
 
Firm-Perceived Worker Authority Measures 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)1 = 1 if firm-perceived worker discretion over how tasks are 
executed is none” or “a little” 
              = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)2 = 1 if firm-perceived worker discretion over how tasks are 
executed is “some” 
                = 0 otherwise 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)3 = 1 if firm-perceived worker discretion over how tasks are 
executed is “a lot” 
              = 0 otherwise 
 
The variable names include “(W)” or “(F)” to indicate which worker authority measures 
reflect worker perceptions and which reflect firm perceptions.  One difference between 
the worker-perceived measures and the firm-perceived measures is that the question in 
the employer survey pertains to the discretion of workers in the establishment’s largest 
occupational group, whereas the question from the worker survey is based on a random 
sample of workers in the establishment.  That is, in the employer survey the respondent 
employer is asked to rate the level of worker authority in the establishment’s “largest 
occupational group” rather than in the establishment as a whole. 
 We experiment with different combinations of authority controls (authority over 
range of tasks performed, worker-perceived authority over how tasks are executed, 
employer-perceived authority over how tasks are executed).  Results are displayed in 
Table A1 and reveal that the authority measure that suggests the strongest empirical 
support for Prendergast’s theory is also the measure that best matches the notion of 
authority discussed in his paper (namely authority over the range of tasks performed).  
That is, the risk coefficient decreases by the most when these particular authority 
measures are included as controls.   
The coefficients on the firm-perceived authority measures often have the wrong 
sign (negative) in Table A1, and a possible reason for this is that these variables measure 
the degree of authority in the establishment’s largest occupational group rather than the 
establishment as a whole.  We might expect that if the dependent variable measured 
incentive pay in the largest occupational group rather than in the establishment as a 
whole, the firm-perceived worker authority measures might have positive effects.  To test 
this hypothesis, we first construct a dummy variable equaling one if performance-related 
pay is used in the establishment’s largest occupational group and zero otherwise.  We 
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then modify this binary incentives measure in the manner described at the start of this 
section (that is, we reclassify from “1” to “0” the observations for which individual 
performance/output is not used in awarding performance-related pay to workers in the 
largest occupational group).22 We make this modification because in this case it actually 
matters, in the sense that support for Prendergast’s model is only found if the 
modification is made.  That is, without the modification the risk coefficient decreases 
only trivially when authority controls are included in the model.  In contrast, as 
mentioned earlier in the section, when the dependent variable is performance-related pay 
in the establishment as a whole rather than in the largest occupational group, the test of 
Prendergast’s prediction yields very similar results whether or not the modification is 
made.23   
Results using performance-related pay (based on individual performance/output) 
in the establishment’s largest occupational group are displayed in Table A2, with various 
combinations of authority controls included.  Several points are worth noting.  First, our 
hypothesis that the firm-perceived measures of worker authority would be positively 
related to incentives if the incentive measure (like the authority measure) is restricted to 
the establishment’s largest occupational group is correct.  The firm-perceived worker 
authority measures are now always positive and statistically significant.  Second, all of 
the other authority measures are positive in all specifications and frequently achieve 
statistical significance.  Third, as was the case in Table A1 using incentive pay in the 
establishment as a whole as the dependent variable, the authority measure that suggests 
the strongest empirical support for Prendergast’s theory is also the measure that best 
matches the notion of authority (namely authority over the range of tasks performed) 
discussed in his paper.  Fourth, the risk coefficient is negative and statistically significant 
in all specifications, even in the absence of authority controls.  The first column of the 
table further strengthens support for the risk-incentives tradeoff implied by the standard 
agency model (our first empirical question).   
 
                                                 
22
 We are able to make this reclassification unambiguously for all 252 establishments that report the use of 
performance-related pay in the establishment’s largest occupational group.  The reason is that even though 
the follow-up question (asking what output measure is used for awarding performance-related pay) is asked 
only of establishments where some non-managerial workers are eligible, it turns out that this criterion is 
met for all 252 establishments.   
23
 As seen in Table A1, for which the dependent variable is performance-related pay in the establishment as 
a whole, the risk coefficient decreases from -0.30 in the first column to -0.37 in the last column.  If instead 
we modify the dependent variable as described at the start of this section, the risk coefficient decreases 
from -0.27 in the first column to -0.35 in the last column. 
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APPENDIX B 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS USED AS CONTROL VARIABLES: 
Single-Establishment Firm: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is either a 
single independent establishment not belonging to another body, or the sole UK 
establishment of a foreign organization and equals 0 if the establishment is one of 
a number of different establishments within a larger organization       
 
Establishment Size: total number of full time, part time, and temporary workers at the 
establishment   
 
Fraction of Part Time Workers: number of part time workers at the establishment as a 
fraction of establishment size 
  
Temporary Workers: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are temporary agency 
employees working at the establishment at the time of the survey and equals 0 
otherwise 
 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are 
employees who are working on a temporary basis or have fixed-term contracts for 
less than one year and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are 
employees who have fixed term contracts for one year or more and equals 0 
otherwise 
 
Number of Recognized Unions:  Total number of recognized unions at the workplace 
 
100% Workers Unionized: dummy variable that equals 1 if 100% of all employees, 
including managers, are covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace 
or at a higher level and equals 0 otherwise (employee-perceived measure) 
 
80-99% Workers Unionized: dummy variable that equals 1 if 80-99% of all employees, 
including managers, are covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace 
or at a higher level and equals 0 otherwise (employee-perceived measure) 
 
60-79% Workers Unionized: dummy variable that equals 1 if 60-79% of all employees, 
including managers, are covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace 
or at a higher level and equals 0 otherwise (employee-perceived measure) 
 
40-59% Workers Unionized: dummy variable that equals 1 if 40-59% of all employees, 
including managers, are covered by collective bargaining either at this 
workplace or at a higher level and equals 0 otherwise (employee-perceived 
measure) 
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20-39% Workers Unionized: dummy variable that equals 1 if 20-39% of all employees, 
including managers, are covered by collective bargaining either at this 
workplace or at a higher level and equals 0 otherwise (employee-perceived 
measure) 
 
1-19% Workers Unionized: dummy variable that equals 1 if 1-19% of all employees, 
including managers, are covered by collective bargaining either at this 
workplace or at a higher level and equals 0 otherwise (employee-perceived 
measure) 
 
0% Workers Unionized: dummy variable that equals 1 if 0% of all employees, including 
managers, are covered by collective bargaining either at this workplace or at a 
higher level and equals 0 otherwise (employee-perceived measure) 
 
Main Activity of Establishment:  1. We produce goods or services for consumers; 2. We 
are a supplier of goods or services to other companies; 3. We are a supplier of 
goods or services to other parts of the organization to which we belong; 4. We do 
not produce goods or provide services for sale in the open market; 5. This is an 
administrative office only. 
 
Single Product:  dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is concentrated on one 
product or service and 0 if it is concentrated on several different products or 
services 
 
Private Sector Franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is a private 
sector company and a franchise and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Non-franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is a 
private sector company but not a franchise and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
establishment is a publicly-traded private sector unit and a franchise and equals 0 
otherwise  
 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
establishment is a publicly-traded private sector unit but not a franchise and 
equals 0 otherwise  
 
Operation Over Five Years:  dummy variable that equals one if the workplace has been 
 operating at its present address for 5 years or more, and zero otherwise 
 
Industry Controls:  (Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas, and Water; Construction; Wholesale 
and Retail; Hotels and Restaurants; Transport and Communication; Financial 
Services; Other Business Services; Public Administration; Education; Health; 
Other Community Services) 
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Table 1:  Empirical Studies Testing the Relationship between Risk and Incentives 
 
Study Measure of Incentive 
Pay 
Measure of Risk Worker 
or Firm 
Type 
Data Econometric 
Methodology 
Risk vs. 
Incentives 
Result 
CEOs:      
Lambert & 
Larcker 
(1987) 
Equity and security 
market returns as a 
proportion of CEO 
cash compensation 
Variance of equity 
and security market 
returns 
CEOs Cross-section 
of 370 U.S. 
firms 
Latent variable 
structural 
equation model 
(-) 
 
Yermack 
(1995) 
Stock option awards to 
CEO 
Variance of returns to 
firm equity 
CEOs Panel of nearly 
6,000 CEO-
year 
observations 
from 792 public 
U.S. 
corporations 
Tobit (0) 
Bushman, 
Indjejikian 
&  Smith 
(1996) 
Use of individual 
performance evaluation 
in CEO’s annual 
incentive bonus 
payment 
Variance of stock 
returns; Correlation 
between accounting 
and stock returns 
CEOs Panel of 1476 
firm-year 
observations 
from 396 public 
U.S. companies 
OLS (0) 
Ittner, 
Larcker & 
Rajan (1997) 
Relative weight placed 
on financial versus 
non-financial 
performance measures 
in CEO’s annual bonus 
contract 
Time-series 
variability in median 
industry accounting 
returns; Correlation 
between firm 
accounting returns 
and stock market 
returns 
CEOs Cross-section 
of 317 U.S. 
firms 
Cross-sectional 
latent variable 
regression 
(0) 
Garen 
(1998) 
Fraction of present 
value of corporate 
income owned by CEO 
Covariation of firm 
returns with the 
market 
CEOs Cross-section 
of 415 U.S. 
corporations 
OLS (0) 
Aggarwal & 
Samwick 
(1999) 
Pay-performance 
sensitivity of top 
executives 
Dollar stock return 
variance 
The five 
highest 
paid 
executives 
Panel of 1,500 
largest publicly 
traded 
companies in 
the U.S. 
Median 
regression; 
OLS with fixed 
effects for each 
executive 
(-) 
Core & 
Guay (1999) 
Total dollar value of  
equity compensation to  
CEO 
Idiosyncratic risk, 
that is, variance of 
stock returns from 
which market risk 
has been filtered out 
CEOs Panel of 6,214 
CEO-year 
observations 
from non-
financial U.S. 
firms 
OLS on the 
pooled sample 
(+) 
Conyon & 
Murphy 
(2000) 
Pay-performance 
sensitivity of CEO 
Variance of 
shareholder returns 
CEOs Cross-section 
of U.S. and 
U.K. firms 
OLS; Median 
regression 
(+) 
Core & 
Guay (2002) 
Pay-performance 
sensitivity of top 
executives; Change in 
the value of stock and 
option holdings 
Percent stock return 
variance 
CEOs Panel of 1,500 
largest publicly 
traded 
companies in 
the U.S. (same 
as Aggarwal & 
Samwick, 
1999) 
OLS (+) 
Aggarwal & 
Samwick 
(2002) 
Pay-performance 
sensitivity of top 
executives 
Dollar stock return 
variance 
CEOs Panel of 1,500 
largest publicly 
traded 
companies in 
the U.S. (same 
as Aggarwal & 
Samwick, 
1999) 
Median 
regression; 
Fixed effects 
(-) 
Mengistae & 
Xu (2004) 
CEO pay sensitivity 
(annual salary + bonus) 
Variance of CEO 
performance as 
captured by the ratio 
of operating profits to 
total sales 
CEOs 10-year panel 
of 400 Chinese 
state-owned 
enterprises 
OLS; Fixed 
effects 
(-) 
Shi (2005) Pay-performance Variance of industry CEOs Panel of over OLS; Median (+) 
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sensitivity of CEO stock returns; 
Variance of percent 
change in industry 
sales 
2500 publicly 
traded U.S. 
firms 
regression 
SHARECROPPING:      
Rao (1971) Frequency of renting as 
opposed to 
sharecropping of farms 
in India 
Variance of farm 
profits 
Rice and 
tobacco 
farmers in 
India 
Three-year 
panel of 104 
farms from 7 
rice-producing 
villages and 
three tobacco-
producing 
villages 
Correlations; 
OLS 
(+) 
Allen & 
Lueck 
(1992) 
Frequency of  Midwest 
farms rented on a 
cropshare basis as 
opposed to a cash-rent 
basis 
Variation of crop 
yield per acre 
Farmers 
in 
Midweste
rn United 
States 
Cross-section 
of farms in 
Nebraska and 
South Dakota 
Multinomial 
Logit 
(+) 
Ackerberg & 
Botticini 
(2002) 
Whether farm is rented 
on a fixed-rent contract 
or a share contract 
Type of crop Farmers 
in 
Renaissan
ce 
Tuscany 
Historical data 
on agricultural 
contracts 
between 
landlords and 
tenants in early 
Rennaisance 
Tuscany 
IV (+) 
FRANCHISES:      
Norton 
(1988) 
Percentage of 
establishments that are 
franchise holders in the 
state 
Demand variability 
in the state 
Establish
ments in 
the state 
Cross-section 
of U.S. 
establishments 
in the 
restaurants, 
refreshment 
places and 
motels 
industries that 
have both 
franchise and 
non-franchise 
operations 
OLS; 2SLS (+) 
Lafontaine 
(1992) 
Franchise royalty rate; 
Franchise fee; 
Proportion of branches 
franchised 
Average proportion 
of discontinued 
outlets in the sector 
Businesse
s across 
sectors 
Cross-section 
of 548 U.S. 
franchisors 
across sectors 
Tobit (+) 
Martin 
(1998) 
Fraction of company 
outlets in the industry  
that are company-
owned 
Sales risk Company 
outlets 
Panel of 
companies from 
18 franchising 
industries 
Weighted least 
squares 
(+) 
OTHER WORKER GROUPS:      
Anderson & 
Schmittlein 
(1984) 
Use of a direct sales 
force as opposed to 
sales representatives 
Expected deviation 
between forecast and 
actual sales; Noise in 
measuring the results 
of salespersons 
equitably 
Firms in 
the 
electronic 
componen
ts industry 
Cross-section 
of 16 
recognized 
electronic 
component 
manufacturers 
in the U.S. 
Logit (0) 
 
 
Kawasaki & 
McMillan 
(1987) 
Proportion of the firm’s 
profit the subcontractor 
receives from the firm 
Variance in the 
subcontractor’s 
production costs 
Japanese 
subcontra
ctors 
Aggregated 
industry cross-
section of 
Japanese 
subcontractos 
IV (-) 
John & 
Weitz 
(1989) 
Fixed salary as a 
percentage of the sales 
worker’s total 
compensation 
Noise in assessing 
the worker’s 
performance; 
Uncertainty faced by  
salespeople 
Firms in 
the 
manufactu
ring sector 
Cross-section 
of 161  U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms whose 
sales exceed 
$50 million 
OLS (0) 
Leffler & 
Rucker 
Payment per tree as 
opposed to lump-sum 
Variance of the value 
of the lumber tract 
Timber 
loggers 
Private timber 
sales contracts 
Logit (+) 
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(1991) payment by the logger 
to the timber tract 
owner 
in North 
Carolina 
Coughlan & 
Narasimahan 
(1992) 
Ratio of salary to total 
pay of the sales worker 
Variance of the 
number of calls it 
takes to close a sale 
Sales 
workers 
Cross-section 
of 286 U.S. 
firms with sales 
workers 
Double-limit 
Tobit 
(0) 
Oyer & 
Schaefer 
(2004) 
Option plans offered to 
employee’s other than 
top executives 
Firm stock volatility; 
Industry stock 
volatility 
Employee
s not in 
the top 
10% of 
the firm’s 
managem
ent ranks 
Cross-section 
of 1,000 
publicly traded 
U.S. firms 
Logit (+) 
Nagar 
(2002) 
Proportion of pay 
comprised of bonuses 
Volatility in 
earnings; Bank 
growth 
Branch 
managers 
Cross-section 
of 100 retail 
U.S. banks 
2SLS (0) 
Adams 
(2005) 
Whether establishment 
offers profit-related pay 
or employee share 
ownership 
Whether 
establishment 
produces multiple 
products; Whether 
establishment has 
achieved a quality 
standard; Whether 
the current state of 
the market is 
growing, declining, 
or turbulent 
Manufact
uring 
workers 
Cross-section 
of 166 British 
manufacturing 
establishments 
Probit (-) 
Foss & 
Laursen 
(2005) 
Percentage of workers 
at firm who receive 
pay-for-performance 
Level of novelty of 
innovations at firm; 
Firm’s perceived 
change in level of 
competition; 
Variance of 
profitability within 
industry 
Manufact
uring and 
non-
manufactu
ring 
workers 
Cross section of 
993 Danish 
firms surveyed 
in 1996 
Ordered Probit; 
Bivariate Probit 
(+) 
Gibbs, 
Merchant, 
Van der 
Stede & 
Vargus 
(2006) 
Bonuses Extent to which 
performance measure  
reflects factors 
beyond manager’s 
control; Extent to 
which performance 
measure reflects 
manager’s overall 
performance 
Auto 
dealership 
managers 
Survey of 326  
auto dealerships 
Tobit (-) 
Wulf (2006) Pay-performance 
sensitivity of division 
managers 
Firm risk defined as 
standard deviation of 
firm sales growth; 
Division risk defined 
as standard deviation 
of division sales 
growth 
Division 
managers 
1986-1999 
panel of over 
250 publicly 
traded U.S. 
firms  
Fixed Effects (-) 
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TABLE 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard Error 
Basic Firm Characteristics:   
Risk 0.218 0.020 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.350 0.024 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year 0.140 0.016 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.233 0.018 
Operation Over Five Years 0.899 0.014 
Main Activity of Establishment 0.686 0.022 
Temporary Workers 0.193 0.017 
Establishment Size 0.062 0.003 
Fraction of Part Time Workers 309.931 15.364 
Number of Recognized Unions 0.637 0.046 
100% Workers Unionized 0.236 0.020 
80-99% Workers Unionized 0.045 0.007 
60-79% Workers Unionized 0.035 0.008 
40-59% Workers Unionized 0.018 0.007 
20-39% Workers Unionized 0.007 0.004 
1-19% Workers Unionized 0.016 0.005 
0% Workers Unionized 0.644 0.022 
Firm Ownership:   
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise 0.016 0.005 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise 0.329 0.022 
Private Sector Non-franchise 0.027 0.009 
Private Sector Franchise 0.469 0.024 
Industry:   
Manufacturing 0.166 0.019 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.002 0.001 
Construction 0.041 0.009 
Wholesale and Retail 0.235 0.022 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.088 0.013 
Transport and Communication 0.048 0.010 
Financial Services 0.039 0.008 
Other Business Services 0.115 0.015 
Public Administration 0.020 0.006 
Education 0.098 0.014 
Health 0.110 0.015 
Other Community Services 0.038 0.008 
Largest Occupational Group at Workplace:   
Managers and Administrators 0.006 0.003 
Professional Occupations 0.099 0.013 
Associate Professional and Technical Operations 0.056 0.010 
Clerical and Secretarial Occupations 0.145 0.017 
Craft and Skilled Service Occupations 0.132 0.017 
Personal and Protective Service Occupations 0.170 0.018 
Sales Occupations 0.162 0.019 
Plant and Machine Operatives 0.138 0.017 
Other Occupations 0.092 0.013 
Incentive Pay:   
Performance Pay 0.196 0.019 
Worker Authority:   
Authority1 0.078 0.016 
Authority2 0.078 0.015 
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Authority3 0.526 0.027 
Authority4 0.317 0.025 
AUTHORITYRANGE(W)1 0.157 0.020 
AUTHORITYRANGE(W)2 0.526 0.027 
AUTHORITYRANGE(W)3 0.317 0.025 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)1 0.032 0.011 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)2 0.307 0.025 
AUTHORITYHOW(W)3 0.660 0.025 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)1 0.281 0.020 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)2 0.441 0.024 
AUTHORITYHOW(F)3 0.278 0.023 
   
Sample Size = 1590   
Note:  Tabulations are for the 1590 establishments in the trading sector for which data on both risk and incentives are 
non-missing and excluding those establishments in public administration.  Some of the above statistics are based on a 
smaller sample, however, due to missing values. 
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TABLE 3:  Evidence of a Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent Variables: Performance Pay 
Risk -0.264*  
(0.180) 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.013  
(0.167) 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year -0.057  
(0.246) 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.211  
(0.153) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-
franchise 
0.258  
(0.479) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise -0.091  
(0.370) 
Private Sector Non-franchise 0.374  
(0.612) 
Private Sector Franchise -0.492  
(0.391) 
Operation Over Five Years 0.233  
(0.210) 
Main Activity of Establishment 0.429**  
(0.174) 
Temporary Workers 0.090  
(0.150) 
Establishment Size 0.183  
(0.120) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers -0.001**  
(0.000) 
Number of Recognized Unions 0.089  
(0.072) 
100% Workers Unionized -0.358  
(0.241) 
80-99% Workers Unionized -0.232  
(0.209) 
60-79% Workers Unionized -0.027  
(0.229) 
40-59% Workers Unionized -0.547  
(0.354) 
20-39% Workers Unionized 0.180  
(0.531) 
1-19% Workers Unionized -0.872  
(0.539) 
Constant -0.307  
(0.480) 
Industry Controls YES 
  
Sample Size 1546 
Note:  Results are estimated coefficients from a probit, with standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
Denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a one-tailed test for  
Risk and two-tailed tests for all other covariates.   
Table 4:  Relationship Between Incentive Pay and Worker Authority 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent Variables: Performance Pay 
Authority2 -0.138  
(0.388) 
Authority3 0.003  
(0.293) 
Authority4 0.556**  
(0.309) 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.035  
(0.185) 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year -0.022  
(0.253) 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.072  
(0.168) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-
Franchise 
0.302  
(0.576) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise -0.188  
(0.436) 
Private Sector Non-franchise 0.245  
(0.681) 
Private Sector Franchise -0.645  
(0.445) 
Operation Over Five Years 0.372*  
(0.209) 
Main Activity of Establishment 0.337*  
(0.191) 
Temporary Workers 0.160  
(0.157) 
Establishment Size 0.287  
(0.183) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers -0.001  
(0.000) 
Number of Recognized Workers 0.059  
(0.072) 
100% Workers Unionized -0.313  
(0.258) 
80-99% Workers Unionized -0.138  
(0.224) 
60-79% Workers Unionized 0.016  
(0.289) 
40-59% Workers Unionized -0.400  
(0.348) 
20-39% Workers Unionized -0.118  
(0.573) 
1-19% Workers Unionized -0.933  
(0.651) 
Industry Controls YES 
Constant -0.544  
(0.611) 
  
Sample Size 1245 
Note:  Results are estimated coefficients from a probit, with standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and ***  
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on a one-tailed test for  
Authority2, Authority3 and Authority4, and two-tailed tests for all other covariates.   
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Table 5:  Relationship Between Changes in Incentive Pay  
                and Worker Authority 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent Variables: ∆Performance PayNM 
∆Authority2 0.290**  
(0.130) 
∆Authority3 0.757***  
(0.189) 
Single-Establishment Firm -0.286*  
(0.164) 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year -0.007  
(0.193) 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.010  
(0.147) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-
Franchise 
0.487  
(0.394) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise 0.428  
(0.347) 
Private Sector Non-franchise -0.040  
(0.500) 
Private Sector Franchise 0.229  
(0.356) 
Main Activity of Establishment 0.042  
(0.166) 
Temporary Workers 0.063  
(0.118) 
Establishment Size 0.085  
(0.080) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers -0.000  
(0.000) 
Number of Recognized Workers -0.069  
(0.072) 
100% Workers Unionized -0.145  
(0.187) 
80-99% Workers Unionized -0.333  
(0.260) 
60-79% Workers Unionized 0.089  
(0.236) 
40-59% Workers Unionized -0.419  
(0.383) 
20-39% Workers Unionized 0.122  
(0.400) 
1-19% Workers Unionized 0.491  
(0.369) 
Industry Controls YES 
Cutoff 1 0.198  
(0.393) 
Cutoff 2 1.111  
(0.410) 
  
Sample Size 1378 
Note:  Results are estimated coefficients from a probit, with standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 6:  Relationship Between Worker Authority and Risk 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent Variables: Authority 
Risk 0.341**  
(0.153) 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.042  
(0.179) 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year 0.033  
(0.163) 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.098  
(0.123) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-
Franchise 
0.596*  
(0.362) 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise 1.035***  
(0.257) 
Private Sector Non-franchise 1.319***  
(0.450) 
Private Sector Franchise 0.913***  
(0.284) 
Operation Over Five Years 0.163  
(0.189) 
Main Activity of Establishment -0.043  
(0.179) 
Temporary Workers -0.133  
(0.146) 
Establishment Size -0.051  
(0.081) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers -0.001  
(0.000) 
Number of Recognized Workers 0.001  
(0.052) 
100% Workers Unionized 0.411***  
(0.147) 
80-99% Workers Unionized -0.020  
(0.222) 
60-79% Workers Unionized 0.295  
(0.332) 
40-59% Workers Unionized 0.019  
(0.340) 
20-39% Workers Unionized 2.080  
(0.593) 
1-19% Workers Unionized 0.136***  
(0.332) 
Industry Controls YES 
Cutoff 1 -0.367  
(0.432) 
Cutoff 2 0.076  
(0.421) 
Cutoff3 1.706  
(0.414) 
Sample Size 1245 
Note:  Results are estimated coefficients from an ordered probit, with standard errors in  
parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
based on a one-tailed test for Risk, but two-tailed tests for all other covariates.   
50 
 
 
TABLE 7: Testing the Main Prediction of Prendergast (2002) 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent 
Variables: 
Performance Pay 
Risk -0.303* 
(0.205) 
-0.381* 
     (0.214) 
Authority2 •  0.049 
      (0.473) 
Authority3 •  0.185 
(0.386) 
Authority4 •  0.753** 
(0.424) 
Firm Controls             YES YES 
   
Sample Size  1245     1245 
Note:  Results are estimated coefficients from probit models, with standard errors in 
parentheses.  Firm controls are those listed in Table 3.  * and ** denote statistical  
significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, based on one-tailed tests.  
 
  
TABLE 8:  Testing the Main Prediction of Prendergast (2002) 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent Variables: Performance Pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk -0.303* 
(0.204) 
-0.376** 
(0.217) 
-0.303*** 
(0.077) 
-0.354* 
(0.217) 
AUTHORITYRANGE(W)2 •  0.081 
(0.236) 
•  0.752 
(1.179) 
AUTHORITYRANGE(W)3 •  0.665*** 
(0.263) 
•  0.954** 
(0.521) 
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES 
ρˆ  0 0 0.095*** 
(0.038) 
0.291 
(0.517) 
     
Sample Size 1245 1245 1245 1245 
Log Likelihood -1674.76 -1657.76 -1673.01 -1657.40 
Note:  Results are parameter estimates from a simultaneous-equations model in which the authority variables are treated as 
endogenous.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively, based on one-tailed tests.  Columns 1 and 2 impose ρ = 0, and columns 1 and 3 impose β2 = β3 = 0.   
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